A Global Study Report | June, 2026

BUILDING THE ALTERNATIVE

Bridging Gen Z Movements and Governance for Lasting Change

Search *for* Common Ground

Youth, Peace & Security

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Bridging Gen Z Movements and Governance
for Lasting Change

A Global Study Report

June, 2026

Led and Guided by Saji Prelis

Researched and Developed by Yahya Qanie

Search is a global peacebuilding organization (est. 1982) operating in over 35 countries. Its core mission is to transform the way people manage conflict, away from violence and toward trust and collaboration. Search leverages the Youth, Peace & Security (YPS) agenda to support youth co-leadership in peace and security issues. The organization works to build resilient, youth-inclusive systems and societies that enable young people to play a meaningful role in shaping peaceful and sustainable futures.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

Acknowledgements

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We are equally grateful to the young people from 22 countries who participated in the deliberative conversations. Their perspectives, reflections, and collective sense-making enriched this study beyond individual narratives, helping validate findings and capture a broader spectrum of youth experiences across contexts.

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Saji Prelis and Yahya Qanie
United States, June 2026

Introduction

Between 2022 and 2026, Gen Z (born between 1997 and 2012) movements became one of the most visible political forces of the decade. In Sri Lanka, mass mobilization forced a sitting president to flee the country and resign. In Bangladesh, students helped bring down a government that had held power for fifteen years. In Nepal, Kenya, Indonesia, Serbia, Madagascar, Cameroon, and Peru, young people — most under thirty — filled streets and squares in numbers large enough to shake governments.[1] [2] [3] Five sitting leaders were forced from office. A generation written off as too online and too distracted to care turned out to be one of the most mobilized political constituencies of its time.

This is not simply another cycle of protest. Across very different countries and regime types, young people are exercising political agency outside formal institutions because the channels meant to carry their voice feel closed, captured, or merely symbolic.[4] The scale is real. To test whether the pattern held beyond the headline cases, this study analyzed more than half a million demonstration data points across 200 countries & territories from 2022 through early 2026, drawn from five independent datasets — Carnegie's Global Protest Tracker, the Crowd Counting Consortium, ACLED, Harvard Dataverse, and the CIVICUS Monitor. The same signature appeared everywhere. But the numbers matter less than what they reveal. The contract between young people and the systems they live under has broken, and the street is where that break becomes visible.

The grievances are not abstract. Education no longer guarantees a job. Public services fail while elites grow rich. Corruption turns opportunity into inheritance. In Nepal, people slept outside government offices overnight just to apply for a passport, and waited months for a driving license — daily proof that the system cannot deliver.[1] For many young people, the problem is not poverty alone but exclusion by design: a sense that the system is rigged, that opportunity is inherited rather than earned.[8] They are told to study, participate, and wait their turn, while the doors to dignity and a secure future stay shut. The paradox runs through the whole story. Many of those leading these movements are the educated and the semi-elite — promised a future by their degrees, then handed economies with nothing to offer them.[8]

This is why protest has become such a powerful channel. When credible routes into decision-making are closed, mobilization becomes one of the few ways left to make a grievance visible and force it onto the agenda. **And it is happening against the steepest democratic decline in a generation: for the first time in two decades, more people live in countries growing more authoritarian than in countries growing freer (see Figure 3).** As that space narrows, the cost of being heard rises — and is paid in lives, economies, and stability. Protest here is not only a tactic. It is what systems produce when they leave young people no other way to count.[9]

And yet. These movements are extraordinary at generating pressure, and far less able to convert it into lasting change. They shift public debate, expose corruption, win concessions, and even force leaders out. But removing a leader is not the same as changing a system — it is the most visible thing a movement can do, and often the least consequential. What matters is what follows: whether laws change, institutions open, accountability deepens, and ordinary lives improve.

By that measure, the record is sobering. Of the twenty major movements assessed in this report, only a few produced durable reform. The rest moved the conversation, won a concession, forced a resignation — and then watched the system reassemble itself. Pressure rarely converts into power. History has done this before: the Arab Spring removed rulers across a region and left little behind; Sudan won real reform, then collapsed into civil war.[3] Winning the moment and securing the day after are different problems, and almost nothing in the current order connects them.

Part of the reason lies in how these movements are built. They are decentralized, digitally native, and intentionally non-hierarchical — leaderful rather than leaderless, with many people leading at

once and no single figure a government can arrest or buy off. That design is a genuine strength. It lowers the cost of joining, spreads the risk, and lets a movement move fast. But it carries the seed of the problem. With no center, no one holds a mandate to negotiate, coordination may slip, and the message drifts. The structure built to fill a square is not the one needed to govern it. A movement can bring down a government by Friday and have no idea what to do on Monday.

This is where this report parts ways with standard accounts of the Gen Z wave. Most commentaries describe the street reality exceptionally well—tracking who marched, where, and why—but stop short of judging the results.

We attempt to go there: **We evaluate these movements systematically.** We scored twenty Gen Z-led movements between 2022 and 2026 against a fixed, rigorous standard for what real success requires. Toppling a corrupt leader is excluded from our metrics entirely—it counts as neither victory nor failure. What actually counts is what changes the day after: in the law, within state institutions, and in the concrete social and economic conditions of young people's lives.

But diagnosing the failure to convert pressure into power is only half the work. **The second half of this report is a practical blueprint for building a bridge.** We map out an architecture capable of spanning the deep canyon between high-velocity street protests and real governance outcomes. It is a structural roadmap designed to turn raw momentum into durable change, decentralized mobilization into policy influence, and youth anger into institutional accountability.

The lens throughout is the Youth, Peace and Security agenda, the framework anchored in UN Security Council Resolution 2250. It lets the report ask a sharper question than "did the movement succeed?" And the answer it points to is clear. The gap between protest and lasting change is not a gap in young people's courage or capacity; they have proven both, at enormous cost. It is that they have no permanent place in the rooms where decisions are actually made — so the pressure they build crests and then drains away.

The challenge, in the end, is alignment. Movements bring speed, legitimacy, and moral urgency; institutions bring mandates, resources, and the power to implement. Neither does the other's job, and nothing in the current order makes them work in concert — the more so because most governments have met these movements with repression rather than partnership, which means the will to build a bridge between them usually has to be created, not assumed.

This report takes no side for or against the protest. It treats protest as a legitimate reality and asks what should come next, because the wave is not going to recede: the grievances driving it are real, and growing. The only open question is whether the systems around these young people get built to receive them — or whether each rising generation keeps paying the same brutal price to be heard, only to lose the morning after.

POSTSCRIPT:

INDIA

As this report was being finalized, a case emerged outside its scope that still traced the same arc. India is not among the countries studied here, yet the pattern held.

In May 2026, India's Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) was born from a single remark — the Chief Justice's description of unemployed youth as "cockroaches" and "parasites" — and within a week had drawn more than 19 million followers, almost double the ruling party's audience. The grievances were familiar: unemployment, corruption, and a system that no longer rewards merit. So was the state's response: the movement's account was blocked on X (Twitter), and its founder reported being targeted by hackers.

It is the report's argument in real time: overwhelming reach, but no path into the rooms where decisions are made. Whether CJP turns that pressure into lasting change, or fades like so many before it, remains to be seen.

Methodology

This study sets out to understand how contemporary youth-led movements mobilize and how their legitimacy can be translated into sustained policy influence through YPS. To do this, it uses a multi-pronged design that combines large-scale data, lived experience, and collective deliberation—allowing both deep, contextual analysis and broad, cross-country comparison. The research rests on five interconnected components.

First, global literature scan. A curated review of over 400 sources on youth movements and the YPS agenda, including academic literature, policy reports, media analysis, datasets, and indexes. This scan was intentionally broad rather than strictly systematic, reflecting the fast-moving nature of contemporary movements and making it possible to capture patterns that cut across regions and political systems.

Second, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). Thirty-two in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted across 10 countries—Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Indonesia, Madagascar, Morocco, Nepal, the Philippines, Serbia, and Sri Lanka—each lasting approximately 1.5 hours. Participants included a deliberate mix of movements influencers, activists, youth professionals, and leaders directly involved in shaping movements or closely observing them. Selection followed a purposive strategy to ensure representation across roles, geographies, and levels of proximity to movements. These interviews provide insight into internal movement dynamics, decision-making, and the challenge of converting mobilization into policy impact.

Third, large-scale quantitative analysis. To test the study's qualitative findings against the global record, we analyzed more than half a million demonstration and movement records spanning 200 countries and territories from 2022 through early 2026. This analysis draws on four datasets—Carnegie's Global Protest Tracker, Harvard Dataverse (Crowd Counting Consortium), ACLED, and the CIVICUS Monitor. It establishes empirical grounding on the frequency, scale, geography, and outcomes of movements.

Fourth, multilingual collective deliberation. A structured deliberative process involving 54 participants across 22 countries, including both people who had taken part in protests and those who had not. Using Remesh, an AI-powered deliberative platform, the process combined structured questioning with open-ended dialogue and real-time responses, enabling participants to build on one another's input while the platform supported large-scale qualitative and quantitative analysis. This deliberation was conducted to capture youth perspectives beyond movement leadership. Given the sample size, the deliberative results are best read as indicative of sentiment and direction rather than as statistically representative; proportions reported from this component (for example, the share of participants citing a given motivation) should be interpreted in that light.

Fifth, AI-assisted synthesis, triangulation, and validation. To strengthen analytical rigor, the authors developed and deployed analytical AI tools to support large-scale qualitative and quantitative synthesis across the datasets, interviews, and deliberative inputs. This enabled thematic analysis, pattern detection, and triangulation, with human review.

Limitations. Several limitations should be kept in mind. Interview and deliberation participants were selected purposively rather than at random, and unintentionally skewed toward educated, digitally connected, and often urban youth; the findings therefore describe the most visible and networked segments of these movements more fully than their wider periphery. The large-scale datasets do not contain a universal age variable, so exact youth participation cannot be calculated; the analysis counts only records explicitly identified as youth-, student-, or young-people-led. These limitations are difficult to avoid when studying fast-moving, decentralized movements in real time. The study's multi-pronged design is intended to offset them through triangulation: a finding is treated as reliable when it converges across independent sources—the literature scan, large-scale datasets, interviews, and deliberation—rather than resting on any single one.

Demographics

Geographic representation of youth participants in the study.



Full List of Representations

1. Afghanistan
2. Argentina
3. Bangladesh
4. Benin
5. Bosnia
6. Bulgaria
7. Burundi
8. Cameroon
9. Colombia
10. DRC
11. France
12. India
13. Indonesia
14. Ireland
15. Jordan
16. Kenya
17. Madagascar
18. Mexico
19. Morocco
20. Nepal
21. Nigeria
22. Peru
23. Philippines
24. Poland
25. Serbia
26. Somalia
27. South Sudan
28. Sri Lanka
29. United States
30. Zambia



Gender representation



Age groups



1.
THE ARCHITECTURE

How Gen Z Movements Are Built

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The Architecture

Gen Z movements are politically sharp, and they understand collective power. They work outside formal structures, official procedures, and fixed hierarchies—and that is deliberate. The looseness lets them form fast and grow wide, pulling in people that traditional organizations rarely reach.[8] [9]

They are often called nonpartisan, leaderless, and free of ideology. That is too clean. The ideology is there: political, economic, and sometimes ethnic. What sets these movements apart is that they choose to set it aside.[10] They organize around what almost everyone can agree on—jobs, corruption, failing schools, clean government—because a shared grievance lowers the cost of joining and widens the coalition. The restraint is tactical; the beliefs are still there. The pattern is not that these movements lack ideology. It is that they will park it to build something bigger.[11]

1.1 Leaderful, Not Leaderless: The most important thing about these movements is how they hold leadership. They are not leaderless. They are leaderful—a term the scholar Joseph Raelin used for leadership shared by many people at once, rather than owned by one.[54] Many people lead, often at the same time. No single person is essential.

They organize this way on purpose. Spread the leadership and you spread the risk: there is no one head figure to arrest, no one figure to buy off. Decisions move faster. The door stays open, because anyone can step up.

But leaderful is a tendency, not a blueprint. These movements run along a spectrum, and context decides where each one lands. At one end, leadership is genuinely dispersed—spread across digital networks and street assemblies with no center, as in Sri Lanka and Nepal. Leaderful does not always mean flat, though. Some movements have no commanding figure but still carry strong internal hierarchies, and a self-appointed "youth leader" who claims to speak for everyone is often rejected by the rest, as in Nigeria.[48] At the other end, one group appoints itself gatekeeper.

In Cameroon, a single youth organization and its leader cast themselves as the movement's only legitimate voice, rebuilding the very hierarchy the model is meant to avoid. Therefore, the report looks for what these movements share without pretending they are all the same.

Leaderful structures are powerful. They survive crackdowns. They move fast. They lower the barrier to entry, and shared ownership gives them legitimacy.[54] They are also fragile in specific ways. Without a center, coordination slips and the message wanders. No one holds a mandate to negotiate. And the movement can be captured—redirected by other actors, as happened in Nepal, where an open structure left room for escalation.[11] The deepest weakness is the one this report keeps returning to: the same design that is built to mobilize is not built to govern. It wins the moment. It struggles with the day after.

1.2 How They Make Decisions: Gen Z movements operate through leaderful, horizontal, and decentralized internal structures, rejecting traditional hierarchies in favor of distributed, multi-actor leadership.[12] They spread agency and decision-making across broad, often digital networks. This structure is sustained by a strong collective ethos, open debate, direct voting, and rotating roles, ensuring that decisions reflect shared ownership and that participants feel included and heard.[13]

In Serbia, students ran the movement through "plenums"—open forums at each university where people argued, voted, and coordinated across campuses. The plenum was the engine. It lets thousands of students act together without anyone in charge.[14]

Sri Lanka went furthest. The Aragalaya movement made decisions in the open, through local assemblies and working groups rather than a single leader.[15] At the GotaGoGama protest camp, "people's assemblies" met daily in a circle. Anyone could propose an action. People voted by a show of hands and acted the same day.[16] When police

blocked a planned march, the assembly rerouted it on the spot, sent marshals from the movement's communications group, and pushed the new route out over WhatsApp. No order came down from the top. The crowd ran it.[17]

This kind of structure pulls more people in and gives them ownership. It also has a cost. Decisions made by everyone are slower to sharpen, and the message can drift. Inclusion buys legitimacy and gives up some discipline.[18]

1.3 How Outsiders See Them: From the inside, these movements are organized—just not in the usual way. From the outside, they look like chaos. That gap matters because governments respond to what they see.[4] Some analysts call these movements "leader-light"; the truer word is leaderful, not leaderless.

A movement with no single leader gives the state nothing to grab. No one to negotiate with. No one to arrest into submission. No one to buy off. So governments treat it as unpredictable and dangerous, and reach for blunt tools: internet blackouts, platform bans, and force.

But what looks like disorder is a design. No visible center means no pressure point. The "leaderlessness" that frightens governments is the very thing that protects the movement—from co-optation, from decapitation, from repression. The confusion is the armor.[20]

1.4 Who Stands Behind Them: The core is young: high schoolers, university students, recent graduates who feel the system has failed them. But they do not stand alone.
Around them is a quieter coalition of professionals—young lawyers, union organizers, professors, teachers.[21] They provide legal defense, advice, and sometimes the thing movements lack most: the skill to turn a slogan into a policy.

In Serbia, professors helped students build a credible slate of candidates.[22] In Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, young lawyers ran policy research and defended the arrested for free, medics treated the injured on-site, and neighbors brought food.[23] [42] [24] That support raises a sharper question: does it decide who shows up at all?

Fear of arrest and injury is the single biggest reason young people stay home (see Section 4). Where legal aid, medical help, and diaspora backing are visible, that fear costs less. The evidence is suggestive, not settled, but it points somewhere practical: the safety net around a movement may pull in more people than any call to be brave. Courage is not the only thing that decides who marches. Protection matters, too. When movements have stronger safety nets, they are more likely to endure pressure, retain participants, and act more strategically.

1.5 The Digital Ecosystem: Everyone knows these movements live online. Fewer people notice that they use the internet for three very different purposes—and the difference is eye opening.

- **The first purpose is mobilization: reach people, move fast, shape the narrative.** The tools are TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, X (Twitter) Spaces, and WhatsApp. The language is memes, hashtags, trending audio, short video—complex politics turned into something a million people can share in an afternoon.[24] In Kenya, the same channels raised money in days to pay for medical care and legal fees.[10]
- **The second purpose is making decisions.** This is smaller, quieter, and far more interesting. The tools are Discord, Telegram, and university-native platforms built for debate and voting. In Nepal, thousands joined Discord servers and live polls to pick a preferred interim prime minister—direct digital democracy, in real time.[23] [52] In Morocco, Discord became a standing public square for coordination and governance.[3] In Indonesia, the process produced a single consolidated list of demands—the "17+8"—handed formally to the government.[12] [25]
- **The third purpose is documentation: a parallel media system.** Livestreams broadcast events as they happen, document abuses, and keep the movement visible. When governments cut the signal—shutdowns, platform bans—movements routed around it with VPNs, offline networks, and diaspora amplification. From Kenya to Nepal to Sri Lanka to Bangladesh, communities abroad kept the information moving.[27] [28]

Here is what matters for the rest of this report. Gen Z movements have mastered the first job. They can mobilize better than almost anyone. The second job—the tools that let a movement decide, govern, and hold itself together—is barely built. That gap, between mobilizing and governing, is exactly where the bridge has to go. Section 5 returns to it.

1.6 What Makes Gen Z Movements Different from Traditional Civil Society: Three things separate these movements from the traditional civil society and previous social/political movements.

- They speak in a global culture.[49] They often adopt symbols, references, and humor that are widely recognizable to their generation, creating a common language that crosses borders, ethnicities, and ideologies.[19]
- They choose speed over planning. Traditional civil society works through long, bureaucratic, and careful processes. Gen Z movements act now and demand change now, and their fluency online lets them outrun any organization with an office and a procedure.[29]
- And they aim somewhere unexpected. Rather than seeking to attract the attention of the government through formal advocacy or policy influence, they invest in educating, activating, and mobilizing their peers.[25]

1.7 Two Generations, Two Theories of Change:

Gen Z (born between 1997-2012) and Millennials (born between 1981-1996) agree on one thing: they do not trust traditional politics. Both look at government and its institutions and see a system that has failed to deliver real change. That shared skepticism is the starting point. What separates them is what they do next. Start with where they agree.

Turns out, the generation gap isn't as wide as we think—at least not when it comes to trust. Both generations line up almost perfectly. They trust the people closest to them: youth peers, civil society, and local leaders. And they both keep distance from the big institutions: national government, the media, and corporations. The takeaway is hard to ignore: confidence flows toward local, civilian actors, not formal systems.

This trust isn't just a feel-good metric; it's a direct map of who holds real legitimacy. Where trust is high—like local actors—people feel seen, included, and powerful. But where trust bottoms out—at the national level or in the newsroom—they see a rigged system. They see exclusion, corruption, and institutions serving elites rather than the public.

So, the real divide here isn't who they trust. It's how they choose to take action, and exactly who they are trying to influence.

Figure 1: Which institutions do you trust the most?



Gen Z follows a trust-based logic. It invests its energy in the actors it already considers legitimate —peers, civil society—and deprioritizes formal institutions. Millennials follow a more pragmatic, influence-based logic.

Figure 2: Which institutions should youth influence to create real change?



Their trust in institutions is just as low, but they still engage national governments and security forces anyway, because they recognize those actors shape outcomes. The simplest way to put it: Gen Z

is revolutionary, treating institutions as largely ineffective; Millennials are reformist, treating them as flawed but still usable.

In the world of Youth, Peace, and Security, this is where we see a massive shift in how each generation uses its power. Gen Z leans heavily into "power with"—building collective, grassroots movements to shake things up from the outside, especially when formal channels are locked tight against them. Millennials, on the other hand, are more willing to work the system from the inside.

But then come the breakthroughs—the major findings that cut straight across both generations. The first is the clearest. **Young people are the most trusted actors—and the primary target young people themselves want to influence (62.5%). They are, in effect, trying to move each other. It reinforces a shared conviction: that youth are both credible agents and the central drivers of systemic change.**

The second is about the media. It ranks as the second priority for influence among Gen Z, and fourth among Millennials—even though neither trusts it much. The signal is telling. Young people distrust the media and target it anyway, because they recognize its grip on narrative and public discourse.

The third is about proximity. A notable minority in both groups still works on the structures closest to home—local government (37.5%) and religious leaders (25%). The logic is reach: a mayor or a respected elder can be pressured and held to account in ways a distant national ministry cannot. In specific contexts—rural, religious, or tightly knit communities—these figures are not a fallback but the real seat of influence. Social proximity still counts.

The last is about who gets left out. Across both generations, the private sector comes last on both trust and influence. Unlike government or media, it is seen as neither a legitimate nor a necessary actor in driving real change. To many young people, business is not a partner in reform but part of the problem—too tied to the ruling order to trust, too removed from daily life to bother pursuing. It is the one actor they neither believe in nor chase.

CASE IN POINT:

SRI LANKA

In 2022, as Sri Lanka's economy collapsed, protesters occupied the seafront outside the president's office and built a village. They called it GotaGoGama. It had no leader. It had a structure.

Every day, people met in open circles for "people's assemblies," where anyone could propose an action. Working groups ran the rest—one for food, one for medical aid, one for communications—and decisions were made by a show of hands and carried out the same day. When police blocked a planned march, there was no commander to call. The assembly rerouted it on the spot, sent marshals from the communications group, and pushed the new route out over WhatsApp. The crowd moved as one, with no single leader at the top.

The camp was not a fringe. It drew students, professionals, monks, and ordinary families, and it held for months. That breadth was the point: with no membership rolls and no gatekeeper, anyone could walk in and take part. The structure that looked like chaos from the outside was exactly what made it durable—and in July 2022, the pressure it sustained forced a sitting president to flee the country and resign.

Why it matters: This is the architecture of a leaderful movement made visible. Authority sat in assemblies and working groups, not in a person. That design made the movement resilient, inclusive, and fast under pressure—and traded away tactical control and a single clear message in return. GotaGoGama is the model at its best: open, legitimate, governing itself in real time. The case of Sri Lanka also had its limits—those limits and gap are where Section 5 picks up.[15 17 18]

2.
THE DRIVERS

Why Young People Rise

Search for Common Ground

The Drivers

Why now? Why these movements, in these years, in so many different countries at once?

The triggers look different from place to place: a finance bill here, a job quota there, a banned app somewhere else. But the trigger is never the cause. Beneath each one sits the same set of grievances, building for years, until a single event tips private frustration into a collective public movement. These movements are not sparked by incidents. They are the product of patterns.[8]

And most of the people in the streets are not who you might picture. They are students, recent graduates, the educated young—the very people who did what the system asked. They studied. They trained. They followed the rules. And they reached adulthood to find the door closed. That gap—between effort and reward, between the promise and the payoff—is the engine under almost everything that follows.[30]

2.1 Core Grievances: Four grievances push young people from the screen to the street. They rarely act alone; they compound.

- **Corruption and Elite Privilege:** The sharpest grievance is also the most personal. In Nepal, the viral "#NepoBaby" campaign set the lavish lives of politicians' children against the daily grind of everyone else—the same degrees, the same effort, wildly different futures, decided at birth.[23] In Bangladesh, a 30% civil-service quota reserved for the descendants of war veterans—widely read as a gift to ruling-party loyalists—lit the fuse.[20] In Indonesia, lawmakers voted themselves housing allowances worth 10X the minimum wage while unemployment climbed.[25] In the Philippines, anger focused on entrenched dynasties and the misuse of more than $2 billion in flood-relief funds. The grievance is not just that elites are rich. It is that the rules bend for them.[31]
- **Public Service Failure:** When the basics stop working, the state's failure becomes impossible to ignore. In Sri Lanka, economic collapse meant shortages of food, fuel, and medicine, rolling blackouts, and deadly queues at the pump.[29] In Morocco, mothers died in under-resourced public hospitals.[3] In Nepal, people slept overnight to apply for a passport and waited months for a driving license. These are not abstractions. They are daily proof that the system cannot deliver.[11]
- **Economic Insecurity:** This is the thread that runs through all of it. In Morocco, youth unemployment for those aged 15–34 stood at 35.8%, with many neither in education, employment, nor training.[32] In Kenya, that share has been estimated 27%, and a 2024 finance bill proposing new taxes on basics—bread, sanitary products—turned the squeeze into a flashpoint.[33] [28] In Cameroon, even the highly educated face dead ends, pushing many toward migration or informal work.[34] As one young man in Cameroon put it:

> *"Imagine going to school for the past 14 to 15 years, then you graduate. At the end of the day, you cannot get a job that can even provide something for you and your family."* —Young man, Cameroon

- **Arrogance and Repression:** Then there is how power answers. Criticism posted online is too often met not with engagement but with contempt—and then force. In Bangladesh and Nepal, governments shut down the internet and banned social media platforms, which young people read as an attack on their rights.[23] In Cameroon, digital activists face surveillance, arrest, and even terrorism charges.[34] In Indonesia, restrictions on platforms like TikTok Live and the intimidation of critics signal a preference for silencing over listening. Repression does not calm the grievances. It confirms it.[25]

Put together, these pressures reinforce one another. Corruption deepens inequality. Failing services erode trust. Economic exclusion shrinks opportunity. Repression closes the last institutional door. By the time youth reach the street, protest is not their first choice. It is what is left. The spark, then, is rarely a single event; it is the moment accumulated frustration finds a public form.

2.2 The Deeper Rot: Beneath the sparks sit grievances that are older and more structural—the slow breakdown of the bargain between young people and the institutions meant to serve them. Three stand out.

- **Erosion of Institutional Legitimacy:** Trust between young people and the institutions of power—government, media, big business—has worn through. Increasingly, youth see the private sector and the mainstream media not as independent checks but as partners of the ruling order. The conclusion is corrosive: that institutions serve money and power, not the public.[29]
- **Violence of Exclusion:** Almost every participant in this study said the same thing—their voices are shut out by design. In Cameroon, the sheer cost of entering politics keeps young people systematically out.[34] In Nepal and Indonesia, the mechanisms, such as youth councils, meant to include them are symbolic, stalled, or cut off from real power.[23] In Kenya, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Morocco, governments point to youth councils and youth ministries as proof of inclusion. Young people see them differently: underfunded, for show, and with no say over the decisions that count.[3] [22] [28] As one young woman in Indonesia put it:

"Where the platform is available, there is another issue about tokenism. Officials only see youth as tools, they really do not hear what the youth say." —Young woman, Indonesia

- **Institutional Impunity:** And above it all, the sense that the powerful are untouchable. In Bulgaria, legal and constitutional loopholes have been used to entrench authoritarian control and abuse of power.[35] In Morocco, political elites act as if the law does not apply to them; in Sri Lanka, those behind large-scale corruption have largely escaped accountability. When wrongdoing carries no consequence, the message to the young is plain: the system protects its own.[3] [29]

2.3 Motivations: Strip away the specific demands and the same motivations appear everywhere: dignity, a future, accountability, justice.[13] Their demands are as much constructive as oppositional.

- **Dignity and Future Restoration:** The most powerful and unifying force is the demand for a livable future and the dignity that comes with it. Every generation has fought for work that matters and a future that holds; for this one, that fight is sharpened by generational loss—a feeling the system has already written them off.[9] Across deliberations, 71% of Gen Z said they mobilize not from economic self-interest but from moral obligation: a duty to dignity, fairness, and everyone's fundamental right to a future.
- **A New System:** When the formal channels feel rigged or closed, young people stop asking for a seat and start trying to build their own table. This impulse is sharpened by a darker global backdrop. The 2026 V-Dem report (see figure 3) finds that 74% of the world's population now lives under autocracy, up from 50% in 2005—a tide of democratic backsliding, populism, and polarization shaping the world young people are inheriting.[38] Against it, they are not only resisting decline but making effort to author what comes next. In Cameroon, youth mobilized to protect the integrity of elections.[34] In Nepal, young voters threw their weight behind an independent 35-year-old promising a clean, simple government.[23] In Serbia, students bypassed the established parties altogether to build grassroots alternatives and find credible, uncorrupted candidates.[14] [19]





- **Accountability and Transparency:** Running through all of this is a fierce demand for accountability—named by 65% of participants as their primary motivation. This isn't just about venting over the grievance of the day; it is about building a lasting shield against the next abuse. At its core, it is a demand for a completely different kind of leadership: one that is accountable, transparent, and serves the public rather than itself and the wealthy.
- **Proof It Can Be Done:** A movement doesn't always need to be born from local hardship.

Digital networks carry symbols and tactics across borders in real time, letting young people mobilize in solidarity with events half a world away—much like the student-led protests that swept the United States.[23] Movements aren't just watching each other; they're actively learning from each other. Interviews revealed a web of cross-border inspiration: Bulgaria drew tactics from Nepal and Serbia; Indonesia looked to Nepal; Nepal to the Philippines. The grievances differ, but the playbook travels.

Figure 5: Youth's perception of the their system.

3.

THE OUTCOME

What Actually Changed & What the Data Shows

Search *for* Common Ground

The Outcome

Between 2022 and 2026, Gen Z movements ousted five sitting leaders—in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Madagascar, and Peru.[20 23 24 36 43] That is a remarkable show of force. But removing a leader is the easy part. It is far harder to fix the conditions that put people in the street, and toppling someone is not the same as creating lasting impact.

The result is sobering. Of the 20 movements examined, only three delivered real change across all three outcome measures—Bangladesh, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. And all three reached it the same way: the streets weren't enough on their own; it took the ballot box too. A youth-backed party or candidate won an election, and turned a moment of pressure into power that lasted.

Figure 6: Global Impact Assessment

Full Data in Appendix A / **View Full Data**

#	Country / Movement	Dates	Non-Violent	Intergen. Coord.	Resilience	Maturity	Decision Platform	Post-Mob. Structure	(a) Policy Reform	(b) Institutional Change	(c) Youth Indicators	Overall
1	Sri Lanka — Aragalaya	Mar–Jul 2022	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Partial	Yes	Yes	Partial	Highly Successful
2	Senegal — 2024 Mobilization	2021–Mar 2024	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Highly Successful
3	Bangladesh — Monsoon Revolution	Jul–Aug 2024	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Highly Successful
4	Bulgaria — Gen Z Anti-Budget	Nov 2025–Apr 2026	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Partial	Yes	Partial	No	Partially Successful
5	Nepal — Gen Z Uprising	Sep 8–12, 2025	Partial	Partial	Yes	Partial	Yes	Partial	Yes	Partial	No	Partially Successful
6	Indonesia — Dark Indonesia / 17+8	Feb + Aug–Sep 2025	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	No	Yes	Partial	No	Partially Successful
7	Philippines — Baha sa Luneta	Sep–Nov 2025	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial	No	No	Partial
8	Serbia — Students in Blockade	Nov 2024–ongoing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	No	No	Partial
9	Morocco — GenZ212	Sep–Oct 2025	Partial	No	Yes	Partial	Partial	No	Partial	No	Partial	Partial
10	Madagascar — Gen Z Mada	Sep–Oct 2025	Partial	Partial	Yes	Partial	Partial	No	Partial	No	No	Symbolic Victory
11	Kenya — Gen Z Finance Bill	Jun-24	Partial	Partial	Yes	Yes	Partial	No	Partial	No	No	Symbolic Victory
12	Peru — Anti-Boluarte / 2025	Dec 2022–Oct 2025	Partial	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Symbolic Victory
13	Iran — Woman, Life, Freedom	Sep 2022–2023+	Partial	Yes	Yes	Partial	No	No	No	No	Partial	Symbolic Victory
14	Cameroon — Post-Election 2025	Oct-25	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial	No	No	No	No	No	Failed
15	Georgia — EU / Foreign Agents	2023	Yes	Partial	Yes	Partial	No	No	No	No	No	Failed
16	Nigeria — End Bad Governance	Aug 1–10, 2024	Partial	Partial	No	Partial	No	No	No	No	No	Failed
17	Uganda — March to Parliament	Jul 23, 2024	Yes	No	No	Partial	No	No	No	No	No	Failed
18	Mozambique — Post-Election	Oct 2024–Jan 2025	Partial	Partial	Yes	Partial	No	Partial	No	No	No	Failed
19	Myanmar — Spring Revolution (Gen Z)	2021–ongoing	No	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Yes	No	Partial	No	Failed (violent)
20	Global — Fridays for Future evolution	2022–2026	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial	No	No	Symbolic Victory

3.1 How We Assessed the Success

To assess outcomes honestly, the study scored 20 major Gen Z–led movements from January 2022 to January 2026 against a fixed standard, whether or not they were included in the interviews and deliberations, and examined them through a YPS lens. [26 41 44 51 55 60]

Ousting a leader is excluded from the scoring entirely—it counts as neither success nor failure. What counts is what changed afterward. Success is defined as real change on three measures: policy or legal reform, institutional or constitutional change, and measurable improvement in young people's economic and social conditions.

Each movement was scored on six factors: non-violence, intergenerational coordination, resilience, strategic maturity, decision-making platforms, and —most important—a structure that survives the protest itself. Each factor and outcome was scored Yes = 2, Partial = 1, No = 0.

Most movements land lower: they shifted the public conversation, won concessions, or forced a resignation, but did not change the system. (The full scoring and the definition of each outcome tier are in Appendix A.)

One caution applies to every verdict here: success is not the same as permanence. Even movements that win real change can lose it—Sudan removed a leader and achieved structural reform before collapsing into civil war.[1] These ratings describe outcomes so far, not guarantees. And it is no accident that the clearest successes ran through the ballot box. Where a movement found an electoral channel, pressure turned into power; where it did not, the pressure dissipated. Elections, more than street victories, are where these movements gains became real.

That is the central finding of this report in one line: these movements are extraordinary at mobilizing, and rarely able to convert that into lasting change.

Not because the young people fail, but because the bridge to governance isn't adopted. Section 6 is about building it.

3.2 What Successful Movements Had in Common: The scoring also reveals what the strongest movements shared. Three patterns stand out.

- **Digital fluency as power.** For these movements, social media is not just a megaphone—it is the architecture. Organizers turn platforms into command centers for real-time coordination, legal aid, and global visibility, shaping not only how a movement spreads but how it decides.[53]
- **Courage under fire.** From Sri Lanka to Iran, young people have risked—and lost—their lives. Faced with live ammunition, abduction, and long prison sentences, their refusal to abandon non-violent discipline has moved public sympathy and forced concessions.[53]
- **Bigger than any one group.** These movements were intergenerational and inclusive. Backed by a coalition of academia, lawyers, anti-corruption veterans, religious leaders, and they pulled in the diaspora too.

3.3 What 500,000 Data Points of Global Protests Show: The case-by-case assessment tells one story. The real question is whether it holds at scale. To find out, the study went wide—analyzing more than half a million demonstration and movement records across 200 countries and territories, from 2022 through early 2026, drawing on four independent datasets: Carnegie's Global Protest Tracker, Harvard Dataverse, ACLED, and the CIVICUS Monitor.

It is one of the largest evidence bases ever brought to this question, and it does something the interviews and deliberation alone cannot: it tests whether the patterns this study found in the countries it examined hold true across the whole world. They do. Four findings stand out.

- **Finding 1: The violence runs one way.** Across the records explicitly tagged as youth- or student-led, 99.2% were strictly nonviolent. That figure is worth reading carefully: it measures nonviolence among events recorded as youth-led, not all youth involvement, and because the datasets tag events inconsistently, some violent episodes may sit under other labels. But the direction is unmistakable. Young people show up peacefully; the force comes back at them. And it escalates fastest at one specific trigger—when youth challenge a regime's legitimacy or its military. Iran's Woman, Life, Freedom movement, Kenya's Finance Bill protests, and Sudan's anti-coup mobilizations all followed the same curve.[1]
- **Finding 2: "Leaderless" is a myth.** The data buries the popular story that these movements are spontaneous and structureless. ACLED's records repeatedly surface formal youth organizations driving sustained mobilization—the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, Youth Association Nepal, the Sunrise Movement, Students Demand Action. This confirms, at scale, the report's central claim: these movements are leaderful—multi-nodal and distributed—not leaderless.
- **Finding 3: Schools are the engine.** Across all four datasets, one staging ground appears more than any other: schools and universities. They are where grievances ignite—from tuition and dress codes to climate, and democratic backsliding—and among the most frequent sites of heavy state intervention. The 2024 US campus protests captured both: a cause that spread into a global movement, and one met with mass arrests and riot police.

The data also reveals an impact gap. Despite the scale of this wave, Carnegie's records show that youth-led movements are coded as having "no policy or leadership change" far more often than any other category—a finding that echoes the earlier 20-movement assessment. But this verdict needs context. Part of it reflects reality, and part reflects how we measure impact: in autocracies, "impact" often means surviving repression while demanding regime change, whereas in democracies, real shifts in public debate and local policy frequently go unrecognized as "national change." Additionally, youth often serve as co-leaders within broader coalitions—essential to mobilizing supporters but invisible in formal coding. The record likely understates youth influence.

The picture holds. The global data neither celebrates these movements nor dismisses them. It confirms one signature pattern: extraordinary reach, limited conversion—and it points to a consistent finding: the gap is not in young people's ability to mobilize, but in the absence of an architecture that turns mobilization into policy.

Figure 7: The Movements Pattern

The Movements Pattern

500,000+ datapoints, 200 countries and territories, between 2022-2026

The Percentage and Role of Youth

The datasets lack a universal age variable, so exact youth participation cannot be calculated. This analysis counts only records explicitly identified as "youth," "students," or "young people."

Across countries, when participants were explicitly labeled as "youth," "students," or "young people," **99.2%** of these mobilizations were **strictly peaceful**, and overwhelmingly nonviolent.

1. Key patterns accross datasets

- Youth act as a primary vanguard in both geopolitical crises (e.g., Israel/Palestine, climate change) and local governance failures (e.g., corruption, tax hikes).
- State responses escalate to extreme violence against youth primarily when youth demand regime change or challenge military authority.

2. Cross-country differences

- **Autocracies/Conflict Zones:** Youth demand broad systematic regime change, democracy, and protection from state violence.
- **Democracies (U.S. or EU):** Youth demand specific policy changes regarding climate action, gun control, LGBTQ+ rights, and foreign policy divestment.

3. The impact of youth movements

- Global Protest Tracker outcomes frequently list "No policy/leadership change" for youth movements, suggesting protests on the streets alone rarely achieve immediate policy-change.

4. Most important findings from across the datasets

Local Governance Triggers

ACLED data shows hyper-local issues (school food, school delays) can trigger mobilization.

Climate Protest Geography

Climate protests are highly organized in the Global North, but underexplored in the Global South.

Campuses as Battleground

Universities are primary conflict zones for state intervention.

Economic Exclusion

Inflation and cost of living hikes are universal trigger across regime types.

Intersectionality across regions

Youth mobilize together across ethnic, religious, and identity-based differences.

Resources

Chenoweth, E., Hamam, S., Pressman, J., Shay, C., & Ulfelder, J. (2025). Crown Counting Consortium [data set collection]. Harvard Dataverse. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/crowdcountingconsortium

Demonstrations Events. (2026). *ACLED data export tool* [data set collection]. ACLED. https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/

Global Protest Tracker. (2026). *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. https://carnegieendowment.org/features/global-protest-tracker

CIVICUS Monitor. (2026). *National Civic Space Ratings* [Data set]. CIVICUS Monitor. https://monitor.civicus.org/data/

Prelis, S. Qanie, Y. (2026). Building the Alternative: *Gen Z Youth-led Movements and Youth, Peace & Security*. Search for Common Ground.

4.
THE PRICE

Risks and Structural Barriers Facing Youth Movements

Search *for* Common Ground

The Price

These movements are overwhelmingly peaceful. The violence almost always comes from the other side.

Showing up has a cost, and young people know it long before they ever step onto the street. The global report "If I Disappear" identifies 8 universal barriers facing youth. In this study, we group them into two categories and focus on the second:

- **Structural Barriers—**the permanent, quiet obstacles that keep young people locked out of power in the first place.
- **Reactive Barriers—**The aggressive measures a government reaches for the exact moment a movement begins to gain traction.[39]

4.1 When the State Pushes Back

Once young people mobilize—online or in the streets—governments tend to react fast, driven by a policy panic that recasts youth as a threat to be contained and suppressed. The pushback takes three forms.

- **Force (Physical Barrier):** The protests are largely non-violent. The response often is not. In Bangladesh, security forces used live ammunition on unarmed protesters.[40] In Kenya, there were documented cases of enforced disappearances and sexual violence.[28] Cameroon, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Morocco, and Indonesia saw their own versions—arrests, assaults, and military deployment.[3] [14] [16] [23] [25]
- **The Kill Switch (Digital Barrier):** Because modern movements live and breathe online, governments look to cut off the digital bloodstream itself. They do this through a mix of internet shutdowns, platform bans, invasive surveillance, and coordinated disinformation. The global tactics are evolving fast: *Criminalizing*—In Cameroon, authorities seized digital devices, detained students, and later hit some with sweeping terrorism charges.[34] *AI and smear campaigns*—In Serbia and Bulgaria, movements were systematically infiltrated and targeted by coordinated smear campaigns, including AI-generated defamatory contents.[30] [35] *Weaponized trolls*—In Kenya, paid "troll farms" were deployed to flood the internet and discredit young protesters online.[28]
- **The Law as a Weapon (Legal Barrier):** Then there is the law itself, turned against the very citizens it is meant to protect. Governments reach for terrorism charges, travel bans, blacklists, bureaucratic obstruction, and the forced closure of organizations. In Cameroon and Kenya, simply running an online group drew insurrection charges.[28] [34] In Sri Lanka, thousands were arrested under laws written to criminalize dissent.[29] In the United States, students didn't just face local police detention they also faced threats to their academic futures and their visa and immigration statuses.[45]

Figure 8: Thinking about joining protests, what worries you the most?



The fear is rational, and the data show it. Over half of all young people surveyed (57%) report a deep fear of mass arrest, legal retaliation, and physical violence. That fear is sharpest among those who have not attended protests—for them, arrest is the single biggest fear.

The fear is not shared equally. Arrest and physical harm top everyone's list. Below that, the worries split by gender (see Figure 9). For young women, the third fear is family and community judgment—named by 60%. The danger, in other words, isn't only the state; it's also being judged or held back at home. They also report about 15% more fear of arrest and violence than young men. For

Millennials, especially young men, the third fear is more practical: losing a job or a place at school. The takeaway is simple: women carry more fear, and a more personal kind, while men worry more about their livelihoods.

Figure 9: M vs F



4.2 The Cost of Doing Nothing

None of this is lost on them. Both Gen Z and Millennials know the danger is real, immediate, and high—and they go anyway. For many, protest is no longer a choice; it is a baseline necessity. It is the only avenue left to be taken seriously and heard.

While the risk is carried individually, the purpose is entirely shared. As one activist put it: "*There is no future for any of us without these movements.*"

Yet across the board, a powerful underlying logic holds true. Young people accept the risk because they believe the future is being decided right now, and they have realized that staying home costs far more than showing up.

For Gen Z, this choice is both practical and deeply moral. They see their rights, dignity, and safety already under threat. They aren't acting out of recklessness; they are making a calculated response to protect their tomorrow.

Ultimately, the math tips toward action because the alternative isn't safety—it is a slower, quieter loss. Staying home does not avoid the price; it simply pays it in installments, while someone else decides your life for you.

Fear does not vanish when they make this choice. They carry it with them to the front lines. What makes the risk bearable isn't the absence of fear, but the presence of others—thousands of peers making the exact same calculation at the exact same moment, and choosing, together, to show up.

"Young people organize… when they have nothing to lose. They risk everything… because the powerful took everything that they have, their hope, their desire, their aspiration."

—Young man, Nepal

THE HIDDEN PRICE

Mental Health Barrier: Although this study focuses on three primary reactive barriers, it is important to highlight the mental health barrier. A 2025 study, by UNICEF and Global Coalition for Youth Mental Health, found that 60% of Gen Z feel overwhelmed by new and global crises, reducing their sense of agency. This diminished sense of agency not only limits their ability to contribute positively to their communities but also contributes to frustration.

In addition, following high-intensity mobilization—especially when met with physical violence—many participants experience burnout, trauma, and a post-movement “black hole” of exhaustion. This creates a cycle in which prolonged engagement becomes difficult to sustain. Despite its significance, there is limited data on how young people cope with or recover from these effects.

This is more than a personal toll—it is part of why movements struggle to last. The energy that powers a mobilization is the same energy that drains when the crash arrives, and with almost no support to help young people recover, burnout quietly becomes attrition. The people who built the movement step back, spent, and the momentum leaves with them.

Read the full study here: https://www.youthmentalhealthcoalition.org/media/591/file/Genz-global-report-EN.pdf

5.
THE MANDATE

Youth, Peace & Security Agenda

Search for Common Ground

Youth, Peace & Security

The Youth, Peace & Security (YPS) agenda emerged from decades of sustained advocacy by youth-led organizations, civil society, and their allies, calling for the recognition and meaningful inclusion of young people in peacebuilding and decision-making. For too long, young people have been systematically shut out of the institutions and negotiations that shape their futures—too often dismissed as either passive victims or threats to stability. This **"violence of exclusion"**—the concrete harm of leaving young people out of decisions affecting them—has repeatedly produced fragile agreements and recurring cycles of conflict.[5] At its core, the YPS agenda makes a straightforward argument: sustainable peace requires meaningful inclusion of young people. Today, that means engaging more than 4 billion people—over half the global population—under the age of 30.[6]

Recognizing youth not as problems to be managed but as essential partners and decision-makers opens the door to more responsive systems and stronger, more legitimate governance.

5.1 UN Security Council Resolutions

The YPS agenda is legally and politically anchored in a quartet of mutually reinforcing resolutions and provide the normative framework for the YPS agenda globally. Collectively they recognize young people's political agency and need for governments to recognize them as critical partners in peace and security outcomes.

- **UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015):** This historic resolution formally recognized youth as a positive force for peace. It established five pillars of engagement—Participation, Protection, Prevention, Partnership, and Disengagement and Reintegration. The Resolution was the result of over 11,000 young people from over 110 countries. It broke the "victim versus perpetrator" framing and called on member states to end the marginalization of young people, particularly in decision-making.
- **UNSC Resolution 2419 (2018):** Sharpened the focus on meaningful participation, especially within peace processes, emphasizing that youth must not only be present but must have real influence over the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements.
- **UNSC Resolution 2535 (2020):** The first to formally recognize the shrinking civic space available to young people and the urgent need to protect it. It mandated the first regular reporting by the UN Secretary-General, urged member states to institutionalize YPS through dedicated mechanisms, and called for sustained, protected funding for youth-led peacebuilding.
- **UNSC Resolution 2807 (2025):** The most recent resolution, adopted at the ten-year mark, reaffirms earlier commitments while calling for accelerated implementation and deeper institutional embedding.

5.2 Major Publications

The resolutions are reinforced by a body of evidence and practical tools that translate the YPS agenda from commitment into action:

- **The Missing Peace (2018):** The agenda's defining evidence base. Built on consultations with thousands of young people worldwide, it demonstrated the "demographic dividend" for peace, introduced the concept of the violence of exclusion, and showed that marginalizing youth from political and economic life is a key driver of conflict, while their inclusion accelerates prevention and recovery.
- **If I Disappear (2019):** A landmark report on the risks faced by young peacebuilders and human rights defenders, documenting patterns of intimidation, violence, and reprisal. It made the case for prioritizing the Protection pillar and identified the structural barriers that systematically constrain youth participation.
- **We Are Here (2019):** A foundational policy paper on youth-inclusive peace processes, whose innovative "in the room, around the room, and outside the room" framework shows that youth participation extends well beyond a seat at the negotiating table to the work of connecting peace processes with wider society, in particular young people.

- **Building Evidence for Peacebuilding Investments (2022):** A Social Return on Investment (SROI) study of youth-led and youth-supporting peacebuilding in Kenya, finding that every $1 invested yields a return of $5 to $10, with benefits extending across the public sector, private sector, and civil society. This report underscores the significant impact of empowering young people in peacebuilding efforts, highlighting the positive outcomes for communities and stakeholders involved in these transformative programs.
- **UN Secretary-General's Biennial Reports on YPS (2020, 2022, 2024, and forthcoming 2026):** The agenda's accountability backbone. Through data-driven analysis, they track global progress and expose persistent gaps—consistently showing that while "Partnership" scores relatively high, "Protection" and formal "Participation" remain dangerously low.

5.3 Common Impact Framework

To move beyond simply counting how many young people take part, and instead measure real-world change, the agenda is increasingly adopting the Common Impact Framework (CIF). Rather than tracking outputs, the CIF assesses five "vital signs of peace"—the underlying conditions that indicate whether a society is becoming more peaceful or less:

1. **Physical Violence (Safety):** People's direct experience with violence—whether they are being harmed, threatened, or feel unsafe in daily life. A reduction in violence and a rise in perceived safety signals progress toward peace.
2. **Personal Agency (vs. Powerlessness):** Whether individuals believe they can shape their own futures and influence their societies. When people feel excluded or powerless, they become more vulnerable to recruitment by violent groups, which makes strengthening agency central to prevention.
3. **Polarization (vs. Solidarity):** The level of trust between individuals and groups. High polarization erodes shared norms and fuels fear and division, while stronger cohesion and solidarity indicate a more resilient social fabric.
4. **Institutional Legitimacy (vs. Corruption):** Whether institutions—governmental, social, or religious—are trusted, representative, and accountable. Low legitimacy weakens stability; credible, responsive institutions reinforce peace.
5. **Resource Investment (for Peace vs. Conflict):** How resources are allocated, and what that signals about a society's trajectory. Spending on weapons and conflict infrastructure points toward instability, while investment in communities, youth, and inclusive systems indicates a commitment to peace.

The framework's five vital signs capture how safe people feel, whether they believe they can shape their own future, how much they trust one another and their institutions, and how a society chooses to spend its resources. What they do not fully capture is economic opportunity itself—whether a young person who studies, trains, and plays by the rules can actually find decent work and build a stable life. That distinction matters here, because economic opportunity is not a side grievance in Gen Z movements; it is arguably their central engine.

The Common Impact Framework registers the consequences when that opportunity is blocked—falling agency, eroding trust, a deepening sense of exclusion—but not the economic blockage itself.

5.4 National Action Plans (NAPs)

The clearest sign of the YPS agenda taking institutional root is the spread of dedicated National Action Plans (NAPs) and Strategies. These plans are what translate global commitments into concrete national policy, budgets, and implementation—moving YPS from principle to practice by embedding youth inclusion within state institutions and decision-making. As of 2026, 14 countries have adopted YPS NAPs, with many others in development. Early adopters have helped set standards and demonstrate feasibility:

- **2021:** Finland and Nigeria
- **2022:** Democratic Republic of the Congo
- **2024:** Malawi and South Sudan
- **2025:** Burundi, Cameroon, Finland (updated), The Gambia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, and Liberia
- **2026:** Italy and Colombia

Figure 10: Nine Structural Barriers

Policy Frameworks

- United Nations Youth Strategy **2030**
- The European Union Youth Action Plan **(2022-2027)**
- African Union Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security **(2020-2029)**
- The Regional Arab Strategy for Youth, Peace and Security **(2023-2028)**
- Council of Europe's Youth Department Priority 3 **(2024-2027)**

YPS Resources

1. **Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security (GCYPS)**: A global multi-stakeholder platform coordinating policy, advocacy, and collaboration to advance the role of youth in peace, security, and decision-making.
2. **YPS Database (YPSDB)** — A centralized database compiling global YPS resources, reports, and tools for research and policy use.
3. **YPS NAP Resources:** A curated collection of guides, tools, and frameworks to support the design and implementation of YPS National Action Plans.
4. **ConnexUs YPS Resource Library**: A broad repository of YPS frameworks, reports, and training materials covering policy, practice, and thematic areas.
5. **UNOY Resources**: A resource hub from the United Network of Young Peacebuilders offering tools, publications, and advocacy materials on YPS implementation.
6. **YPS Monitor:** A platform that tracks and analyzes how countries implement the Youth, Peace and Security agenda, with data on participation and national action plans.
7. **YPS Lexicon (key terms):** A glossary and knowledge tool that standardizes key terms used in the Youth, Peace and Security field.

6.
THE BRIDGE

Translating Protests into Policy Influence

Search *for* Common Ground

The Bridge

This report points to one critical gap, and the evidence is overwhelming. Of the 20 Gen Z movements assessed here, only three produced durable change. The half-million-record analysis confirms the same pattern: extraordinary reach, almost no conversion. This is not bad luck or weak commitment—it is structural. Mobilization and governance are different problems, and nothing in the current system connects them.

What follows is not a menu of options. It is a single argument: citizen participation cannot be a moment in time. What is needed is a permanent architecture with four components: 1) Youth coalitions that organize and sustain pressure, 2) Institutions with the mandate and capacity to respond, 3) Technology that listens at scale and helps in decision-making, 4) a measurement framework that tracks whether things are making a difference. Everything below explores that architecture.

"We didn't have a clue on what to do or what to expect after the president and the prime minister left office. So there was no vision which became a problem moving forward for the movement." —Young man, Sri Lanka

The structures that were supposed to be the bridge aren't. Ministries of youth, national youth councils, youth parliaments—too often these are echo chambers, dominated by political elites, rewarding loyalty while disconnected from the street.[46] They were built for youth, but never given power. The YPS National Action Plans (NAPs) and Strategies are meant to be different—a binding national commitment rather than a token body.[4] Here, the problem is not the design of the NAP; it is that the design has barely been built. Only about a dozen countries have adopted a YPS NAP, and most that exist are paper: slow to roll out, starved of budget, short on political will. The outcomes show it.

The three movements this report counts as successes—Sri Lanka, Senegal, Bangladesh—had no YPS NAP at all. And of the countries that did, the two that saw major youth movements in this wave, Nigeria and Cameroon, both ended in failure. This tells us something important; a NAP on paper changes nothing. The bridge is not the document; it is the architecture that the document is supposed to fund and build upon.

One might object: if those three succeeded without a YPS architecture, why build one? Look at how they actually succeeded. The assessment shows (Appendix A) each ended up improvising the very thing the architecture provides—youth coalitions, channel to turn pressure into power, a structure that outlived the protest. Those wins came late, and at a terrible price: lives lost, economies wrecked, years of turmoil.

So the task is not to invent a new framework. It is to build the one that already exists: funded, embedded in law, and wired to actual decisions. The YPS agenda is the design for the bridge. The rest of this section is how to construct it.

6.1 YPS as the Governance Architecture:

Protest can force attention. Governance is messy, slower and harder—it runs on mandates, coalitions, institutions, processes, and evidence. The YPS agenda is what connects the two. It offers an enduring architecture: youth coalitions that work across divides, government actors with a mandate to respond, and national strategies that turn youth priorities into measurable commitments. Kenya shows it in motion. Even as youth protests voiced deep distrust and demanded the president's resignation, a parallel governance pathway took shape: a national coalition of 230 youth organizations across all 47 counties, working with ministries and local actors, asking a different question—how do we make young people feel seen, heard, and valued through a national strategy, and how do we collaborate (youth and government actors) as co-leaders to measure whether it is working?

That is the model in one line. Youth coalitions organize. Technology listens at scale. Institutions respond. And the CIF framework and SROI measures whether things are actually improving.

6.2 The Deliberative-Technology Opportunity:

Gen Z movements are digitally native, decentralized, fast-moving, and leaderful. Yet most governance systems still listen through slow, centralized, and highly selective consultation formats. This mismatch creates a participation gap: the people most visible in formal youth consultations are often those already closest to institutions — urban, educated, digitally confident, and connected to civil society networks. These formats can produce polished recommendations, but they often miss the wider signal: rural grievances, conflict-affected realities, unemployed youth, young women, marginalized groups, diaspora voices, digitally constrained communities, and those afraid of public exposure.[59]

Deliberative technology can help close that gap, but only if it is treated as part of governance architecture, not as a digital survey or technical add-on.[59] Its value is not simply that it allows more people to participate online. Its deeper value is that it can convert dispersed youth voice into structured public intelligence: a living map of grievances, priorities, consensus, disagreement, risk, and legitimacy.[59] This section draws in particular on Lena Slachmuijlder's report, Deliberative Technologies in Youth, Peace & Security: Promise, Practice, and the Uptake Gap, which distills eighteen months of YPS experimentation with AI-enabled deliberative tools.

Concretely, the tools already exist. Platforms such as Pol.is, Remesh, and Talk to the City differ from conventional consultation tools in four important ways:

- They allow participants to generate statements in their own words, rather than merely selecting from fixed survey options.
- They make disagreement visible by showing where participants converge, divide, or form distinct opinion groups.
- They create safer participation spaces through anonymity or reduced identity visibility, which matters in repressive, polarized, or socially sensitive contexts.
- They support sensemaking at scale by using clustering and synthesis to help coalitions and institutions identify patterns faster than conventional qualitative review.[59]

These tools are no longer theoretical. Across YPS pilots, a single Pol.is consultation reached young people in 42 countries—113 participants, 61 statements, and 857 votes. The value of this process was not only the number of people reached, but the kind of signal it produced.[59] It showed where participants converged, where they disagreed, and which issues required further dialogue. That is the point of deliberation: not to manufacture consensus, but to map where legitimacy exists, where it is contested, and what must be worked through before a demand becomes policy.[59]

Other pilots show how this approach can reach beyond established youth networks and into the wider population. In Nigeria, Talk to the City was used during the review of the first year of the YPS National Action Plan to move beyond Abuja-centered consultation. Because the tool worked through WhatsApp and allowed voice-note participation, it reduced barriers linked to literacy, language, confidence, and formal writing.[59] The result was not only more participation, but different participation: youth raised concerns less visible in elite spaces, including policing abuses, educational exclusion, ethnic tension, and region-specific grievances from conflict-affected areas.[59] In the DRC and AU–EU youth advocacy processes, Remesh helped surface candid reflections on political manipulation, symbolic consultation, tokenism, adultism, and advocacy risks — precisely the kinds of truths that existing consultation structures often fail to capture.[59]

The main lesson is that technology alone does not create inclusion. Design does. Deliberative tools work when participation happens through channels people already trust; when invitations come through credible local messengers; when prompts are written in plain language; when voice, translation, and hybrid options reduce access barriers; and when anonymity, consent, data protection, and careful handling of sensitive quotes are treated as core design requirements.[59] A deliberative prompt is not a survey question. If it is too broad, it produces noise. If it is too narrow, it produces performative agreement. It must be specific enough to generate usable insight while remaining open enough for young people to define

the problem in their own terms.[59]

This matters because the behavior is already there. Nepal's protesters used Discord to deliberate over interim leadership; Indonesia's youth distilled their grievances into a shared "17+8" list of demands.[52] [25] Young people are already using digital spaces to deliberate, document, coordinate, prioritize, and make claims on power. What is missing is not youth capacity. What is missing is the political will to listen and a structured channel capable of receiving that capacity.

The deeper challenge, is the "uptake gap": the distance between listening and actual influence.[59] Even when deliberative tools work technically, institutions and coalitions may not know how to use what they reveal. Wider participation can challenge what formal youth leaders assumed their constituencies believed. AI can cluster and summarize, but humans must still interpret what the patterns mean, what can be elevated safely, and what requires further dialogue. If participants never see how their input shaped decisions, deliberation becomes extraction with better software.

For Gen Z movements, deliberative technology can help move from expression to influence. For governments and YPS coalitions, it can create a repeatable listening system across the policy cycle:

- **Before policy design**, to identify grievances and trust gaps;
- **During drafting**, to test whether commitments carry legitimacy;
- **During implementation**, to gather real-time feedback;
- **During review**, to measure whether people experience institutions as safer, more responsive, and more accountable.

Used well, deliberative technology can translate movement energy into public intelligence. Used poorly, it becomes another survey.[59] The difference lies in whether governments, youth coalitions, and international partners invest not only in platforms, but in the practices that make listening trustworthy, inclusive, safe, and consequential.

CASE IN POINT:
TAIWAN

Taiwan built deliberation into governing. Using an open platform called Pol.is, its vTaiwan process lets citizens weigh in on contested questions—but the tool works differently from social media. Instead of rewarding the loudest or most divisive voices, it maps where people actually agree, surfacing the rough consensus hidden under the noise.

Those consensus points don't disappear into a report. They feed directly into law. Taiwan has used the process to shape real rules on genuinely hard issues—from regulating ride-sharing to online alcohol sales—with thousands of citizens helping write the outcome.

Why it matters: This is the model this report argues for, already working. It shows the three conditions that make deliberation technology real rather than decorative—it is built to find agreement, it is transparent, and the government commits in advance to act on what it produces.

6.3 How the Architecture Measures Impact: A governance architecture no one can measure is a bridge neither party will invest in. So the architecture needs a way to show, in evidence, whether it works—not whether youth are meeting with officials or just more policies on paper, but whether the things that actually hold a society together are improving. That is what the Common Impact Framework (CIF) is built to do.

CIF tracks five vital signs of a society: **safety** (the absence of violence), **agency** (whether people believe they can make a difference in their community), **trust** (whether groups trust one another enough to share a social contract), **legitimacy** (whether institutions are accountable and trusted), and **resources** (whether resources are actually flowing toward a better society). It is no longer "did the protest win a concession?" but "did agency rise, did legitimacy recover, did trust between groups hold?" A movement can drive a president from office and still leave people feeling just as powerless, and trusting their institutions

even less. That is not peace—and CIF shows it: it tracks whether life on the ground actually changed.

It measures through three approaches, and each fits a movement's fast, messy reality.

- Lived experience uses indicators that young people define themselves.
- Aligned measures are a common set of global standards and national indicators.
- Expert observations let practitioners catch the unexpected shifts that standard tracking misses.

Together, they answer the question this report keeps raising: Is the bridge actually rebuilding the agency and legitimacy that the protest exposes as broken? Tracked over time, CIF also catches the fade—the day after problem—because a vital sign that spikes during mobilization and sinks a year later is a measurable warning, not a vague disappointment.

That leaves the hardest question governments and donors ask: Is it worth paying for? This is where Social Return on Investment (SROI) does its work. SROI asks the people who lived it what changed for them, and what that change is worth, then sets the total against what was spent.

The evidence is not hypothetical. A study of youth peacebuilding in Kenya found that every $1 invested produced between $5 and $10 in social value—and that the return rose during the tense run-up to national elections, precisely the high-stakes moments this report is about. It is among the higher-return investments a society can make, and it pays most when the stakes are highest.

None of this assumes governments and movements want the same things, or on the same timeline. Governments weigh stability and the cost of disruption; movements push for change, and soon. That difference is real—and measurement is precisely what works across it. The return gives a government a self-interested reason to build around its priorities: legitimacy and stability cost less than repression and unrest.

For movements, measurement is more than just checking on power. A movement that can show the vital signs slipping would generate a response that is far harder to dismiss; it is arguing in the language decision-makers actually answer to—outcomes and value, not grievance alone. And after the protest, that same data is what holds a government to its word, letting a movement keep the pressure on with evidence instead of crowds.

Figure 11: YPS as Governance Architecture



7. RECOMMENDATIONS

What Movements, governments, and the Global Community Must Do Now

Search *for* Common Ground

7.1 Recommendations for Youth Movements:

Over 62% of young people name other young people as their primary target of influence. That raises a hard question: influence them toward the next march, or toward the capacity to govern? Real change means moving from resistance to reconstruction. Protests can remove leaders and disrupt systems; they rarely produce governance on their own.[47] The challenge is no longer mobilizing—it is being ready to govern.[48] Four capacities make the difference.

1. **Build for the day after.** Convert the momentum into something that endures: a standing coalition with a platform that reaches the places where decisions actually get made. That is the "in-and-out" discipline: keeping the network alive on the outside while building durable structures and stepping inside institutions, so the network itself becomes leverage for policy influence. Energy left in the moment drains away; energy built into structure compounds. The movements that last do not try to stay at a permanent intensity. They convert a moment of pressure into a lasting voice.
2. **A governance-first vision.** Movements need to move past critique and put concrete, implementable alternatives on the table—turning "corruption is everywhere" into policy that can be passed and measured. That means investing early in the unglamorous skills: policy analysis, legislative process, and the ability to work within an institution rather than only oppose it.
3. **Intergenerational alliances.** Durable change depends on alliances beyond the movement—civil society, academia, labor, legal experts, reform-minded politicians, the private sector, and international partners. Without those coalitions, the handoff from mobilization to policy breaks down.
4. **Participatory systems.** If a movement preaches inclusive, transparent, and accountable governance, it has to practice it. The same digital platforms used to mobilize should be used to deliberate en masse, as done in Nepal using Discord—to build leverage point. Movements have already built a parallel media system; the next step is a parallel system for monitoring and accountability.

"I had hoped that the latest youth leadership movement would generate greater civic engagement, drive social change,…. In practice, it did raise awareness of issues and spark important conversations, but it had a limited impact on concrete policies." —Young man, Gen Z

7.2 Recommendations for the Governments:

Governments tend to treat youth mobilization as a crisis to manage and young people as a risk to contain. That is the wrong frame. A mobilization is feedback—a signal about failures in jobs, education, accountability, and governance. Met with force, it doesn't disappear; it hardens, and the costs compound. The YPS answer is the opposite: protection, partnership, and real participation. Four steps matter.

1. **Make participation always on.** Replace one-off consultations with youth with continuous engagement, ensuring they help shape how policy is designed, delivered, and monitored—not merely invited in once a crisis hits.
2. **Adopt and strengthen YPS National Action Plans—for real.** Build these action plans and strategies with youth coalitions (including national youth councils as partners, not gatekeepers), and embed them in law—across ministries and agencies—so they survive a change of government. A National Action Plan is worth nothing on paper; it has to be funded, binding, and built with youth rather than for them.
3. **Reform patronage systems.** Entrenched patronage decides who gets access and who doesn't. Governments and politicians have to open merit-based succession pathways for political participation into political life and dismantle the structural barriers that keep young people out.
4. **Build deliberation into decision-making.** The tools described in 6.2 are not a suggestion box. When wired into real decisions—budgets, regulation, local planning—they let governments hear their population, particularly young people, continuously and respond accountably, at low cost.

7.3 Recommendations for the International Community: International actors too often watch from a distance, prioritizing short-term stability in ways that quietly prop up the status quo. Young people notice: they describe the international community as distant, quiet, and closer to governments than to citizens. The study found that their trust is moderate and fragile. Moving from observer to partner—with both governments and young people—means four things.

1. **Treat internet shutdowns as rights violations.** In 2026, digital rights are synonymous with physical safety. Regional and multilateral bodies should treat shutdowns and platform bans like any other serious abuse—through diplomatic pressure, and where warranted, targeted sanctions.
2. **Build Bridges and Protect the Civic Spaces.** International NGOs, supported by donors and the private sector, can act as bridges between youth movements and governments, translating youth grievances into structured policy dialogue and reducing the risk of reactive, panic-driven responses. But this only works if youth are treated as genuine partners and co-leaders—not as checkbox exercises that further erode trust. ***This requires a movement mindset, not a project mindset.*** International actors must think in terms of sustained mobilization and long-term institutional change, not time-bound deliverables. When done this way, bridge-building can de-escalate tensions, protect civic space, and support more constructive, governance-oriented outcomes.
3. **Mandate YPS Across Field Missions.** The United Nations should require all field missions to develop and operationalize context-specific YPS strategies—in partnership with civil society and youth groups—with dedicated capacity and resources. The 2023 evaluation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services highlighted that only 7 out of 37 missions have integrated YPS into their core planning.[37]
4. **Shift to Flexible Micro-Funding Mechanisms.** Current funding models reward the formally registered and the bureaucratically fluent, which locks out exactly the informal networks and student-led initiatives doing the work. But informal coalitions bring superpowers that registered organizations often lack: speed, authenticity, trust within communities, and the ability to mobilize quickly without bureaucratic friction. The donor community should develop flexible, low-barrier, trust-based funding mechanisms (not risk-based) that support informal vetted youth networks, digital coalitions, and student-led initiatives—prioritizing impact over strict administrative compliance. This means creating pathways for unregistered groups to access resources through intermediaries they trust, allowing for rapid deployment, and accepting that some administrative looseness is the price of reaching the movements that matter most.

REALITY CHECK:
POLITICAL WILL

All of this assumes a government willing to engage—and this report's own data shows most are not. The dominant state response to youth mobilization has been repression, not partnership. Where political will exists, the priority is to build the bridge. Where it doesn't, the job is to create that will.

This is where the pieces connect: youth coalitions too large and legitimate to ignore, international actors who raise the cost of repression, and deliberative platforms that generate collective intelligence so structured, visible, and legitimate that governments pay a price for dismissing it. Political will is rarely granted. It is manufactured—by raising the cost of saying no.

One critical clarification. Raising that cost does not mean escalating protest. This report neither advocates for protest nor condemns it; it treats protest as a legitimate form of expression and a political reality. The pressure described here is structural and institutional—the kind generated through sustained coalitions, documented collective intelligence, and international scrutiny. It is the kind a government cannot answer with force.

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APPENDIX A: Global Impact Assessment Data

#	Country / Movement	Non-Violence	Intergen. Coord.	Resilience	Maturity	Decision Platform	Post-Mob. Structure	Total Factors (max 12)	(a) Policy Reform	(b) Institutional Change	(c) Youth Indicators	Total Outcomes (max 6)	Combined Score (max 18)	Overall
1	Sri Lanka	2	2	2	1	1	1	9	2	2	1	5	14	Highly Successful
2	Senegal	1	2	2	2	1	2	10	2	2	1	5	15	Highly Successful
3	Bangladesh	1	2	2	2	1	2	10	2	2	1	5	15	Highly Successful
4	Bulgaria	2	2	2	1	1	1	9	2	1	0	3	12	Partially Successful
5	Nepal	1	1	2	1	2	1	8	2	1	0	3	11	Partially Successful
6	Indonesia	1	2	2	2	1	0	8	2	1	0	3	11	Partially Successful
7	Philippines	2	2	2	1	1	1	9	1	0	0	1	10	Partial
8	Serbia	2	2	2	2	2	1	11	1	0	0	1	12	Partial
9	Morocco	1	0	2	1	1	0	5	1	0	1	2	7	Partial
10	Madagascar	1	1	2	1	1	0	6	1	0	0	1	7	Symbolic Victory
11	Kenya	1	1	2	2	1	0	7	1	0	0	1	8	Symbolic Victory
12	Peru	1	2	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	Symbolic Victory
13	Iran	1	1	2	1	0	0	5	0	0	1	1	6	Symbolic Victory
14	Cameroon	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	Failed
15	Georgia	2	1	2	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	6	Failed
16	Nigeria	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	Failed
17	Uganda	2	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	Failed
18	Mozambique	1	1	2	1	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	6	Failed
19	Myanmar	0	2	2	1	1	2	8	0	1	0	1	9	Failed (original goals)
20	Global — Fridays for Future evolution	2	2	1	1	1	1	8	1	0	0	1	9	Symbolic Victory

Rank	Country / Movement	Dates	Factor Score (/12)	Outcome Score (/6)	Combined (/18)	Overall Rating
1	Senegal — 2021–2024 Mobilization	2021–Mar 2024	10	5	15	Highly Successful
2	Bangladesh — Monsoon Revolution	Jul–Aug 2024	10	5	15	Highly Successful
3	Sri Lanka — Aragalaya	Mar–Jul 2022	9	5	14	Highly Successful
4	Bulgaria — Gen Z Anti-Budget	Nov 2025–Apr 2026	9	3	12	Partially Successful
5	Serbia — Students in Blockade	Nov 2024–ongoing	11	1	12	Partial
6	Nepal — Gen Z Uprising	Sep 8–12, 2025	8	3	11	Partially Successful
7	Indonesia — Dark Indonesia / 17+8	Feb + Aug–Sep 2025	8	3	11	Partially Successful
8	Philippines — Baha sa Luneta	Sep–Nov 2025	9	1	10	Partial
9	Myanmar — Spring Revolution (Gen Z)	2021–ongoing	9	1	10	Failed (original goals)
10	Global — Fridays for Future evolution	2022–2026	8	1	9	Symbolic Victory
11	Kenya — Gen Z Finance Bill	Jun 2024–ongoing	7	1	8	Symbolic Victory
12	Morocco — GenZ212	Sep–Oct 2025	5	2	7	Partial
13	Madagascar — Gen Z Mada	Sep–Oct 2025	6	1	7	Symbolic Victory
14	Iran — Woman, Life, Freedom	Sep 2022–2023+	5	1	6	Symbolic Victory
15	Georgia — EU / Foreign Agents	2023–ongoing	6	0	6	Failed
16	Mozambique — Post-Election	Oct 2024–Jan 2025	6	0	6	Failed
17	Peru — Anti-Boluarte / 2025	Dec 2022–Oct 2025	5	0	5	Symbolic Victory
18	Cameroon — Post-Election 2025	Oct 2025–ongoing	3	0	3	Failed
19	Nigeria — End Bad Governance	Aug 1–10, 2024	3	0	3	Failed
20	Uganda — March to Parliament	Jul 23, 2024	3	0	3	Failed

Region	Country / Movement	Combined Score	Overall Rating
Caucasus/E. Europe	Georgia — EU / Foreign Agents	6	Failed
Central Africa	Cameroon — Post-Election 2025	3	Failed
East Africa	Kenya — Gen Z Finance Bill	8	Symbolic Victory
East Africa	Madagascar — Gen Z Mada	7	Symbolic Victory
East Africa	Uganda — March to Parliament	3	Failed
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria — Gen Z Anti-Budget	12	Partially Successful
Eastern Europe	Serbia — Students in Blockade	12	Partial
Global	Global — Fridays for Future evolution	9	Symbolic Victory
Latin America	Peru — Anti-Boluarte / 2025	5	Symbolic Victory
Middle East	Iran — Woman, Life, Freedom	6	Symbolic Victory
North Africa	Morocco — GenZ212	7	Partial
South Asia	Bangladesh — Monsoon Revolution	15	Highly Successful
South Asia	Sri Lanka — Aragalaya	14	Highly Successful
South Asia	Nepal — Gen Z Uprising	11	Partially Successful
Southeast Asia	Indonesia — Dark Indonesia / 17+8	11	Partially Successful
Southeast Asia	Philippines — Baha sa Luneta	10	Partial
Southeast Asia	Myanmar — Spring Revolution (Gen Z)	10	Failed (original goals)
Southern Africa	Mozambique — Post-Election	6	Failed
West Africa	Senegal — 2021–2024 Mobilization	15	Highly Successful
West Africa	Nigeria — End Bad Governance	3	Failed




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